Privileging Consolidation and Proscribing Cooperation

The Perversity of Contemporary Antitrust Law

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21259201
AutoresSandeep Vaheesan (autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen1
Número1
Fecha de publicación2020-01-01
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Law and Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2693-9681 • E-ISSN: 2693-9681
EditorialCalifornia Digital Library (CDL) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5070/lp61150255
OpenAlexW3103303418
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas4

Democratic and Republican administrations and the Supreme Court, in implementing antitrust law as “a consumer welfare prescription” over the past 40 years, reached a consensus on two important issues. First, antitrust enforcers and courts have presumed that corporate mergers generally advance, or at least do not threaten, consumer welfare. Second, enforcers and courts have treated horizontal collusion, among both big and small actors, as the principal evil for antitrust enforcers to root out. This deference to the consolidation of business property and hostility to horizontal agreements have concentrated power in the economy among a small elite. For antitrust law to redistribute power downward, a radical philosophical change is necessary. First, antitrust law should tightly restrict the consolidation of corporate property. Second, policymakers should recognize that collusion among powerless actors can represent socially desirable cooperation. Reconstructing antitrust law in this manner would transfer power in markets away from corporate executives and financial interests to workers, professionals, and small firms

Collusion · Consumer welfare · Corporate governance · Corporate law · Deference · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Market economy · Market power · Monopoly · Political science · Predatory pricing · Shareholder · Supreme court · Welfare · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Finance

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