Singular Experience
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21293577 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ali Rezaei (0000-0002-4884-4830, New York University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 102 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 389-406 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-04-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2023.2174998 |
| OpenAlex | W4377194067 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 32 |
Almost every case of visual experience is as of a unified state of affairs and as of one or more specific particulars. I argue that a view on which the content of visual experience is a singular proposition, does a better job at explaining these two features of visual experience than three popular theories: the Complex Property Theory, Generalism, and Fregean Particularism. The defended view, however, entails that there are no visual hallucinations, traditionally understood. I make the case for the plausibility of this consequence
Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Property (philosophy) · Proposition · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Hallucinations in medical conditions · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
New Thinking about Propositions
A World of States of Affairs
The Unity of Perception
The Character of Consciousness
The possible worlds theory of visual experience
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference
Intentionality
John Searle's Philosophy of Language
How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularityandthe Generality of Experience
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |