Kantian Naturalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293646
AutoresE Sonny Elizondo (0000-0002-2661-0830, University of California, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen103
Número3
Páginas671-685
Fecha de publicación2025-07-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2024.2388615
OpenAlexW4403369995
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas19

I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I think the form of argument he uses to support these conclusions is not as wrong-headed as it might at first appear. I consider and answer two objections: first, that the argument is inconsistent with Kant’s moral rationalism; and second, that the argument is inconsistent with post-Kantian developments in science. I argue that both objections rest on a common mistake, namely, the assumption that the account of (human) nature on which Kant’s argument relies is theoretical. On the contrary, the relevant account is practical: informed by science, but not determined by it. Once we appreciate the practical character of Kant’s naturalism, we can see not only that Kant can be a naturalist and a rationalist, but contemporary Kantians can be as well

Epistemology · Naturalism · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History