The rational roles of experiences of utterance meanings
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21335281 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Berit Brogaard (0000-0001-8712-0897, University of Miami, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Volumen | 69 |
| Número | 5 |
| Páginas | 2706-2742 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-05-28 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2341408 |
| OpenAlex | W4395032899 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 66 |
The perennial question of the nature of natural-language understanding has received renewed attention in recent years. Two kinds of natural-language understanding, in particular, have captivated the interest of philosophers: linguistic understanding and utterance understanding. While the literature is rife with discussions of linguistic understanding and utterance understanding, the question of how the two types of understanding explanatorily depend on each other has received relatively scant attention. Exceptions include the linguistic ability/know-how views of linguistic understanding proposed by Dean Pettit and Brendan Balcerak Jackson. On these views, to tacitly linguistically understand a sentence just is to possess the linguistic ability/knowledge-how needed to derive/infer what is said by different utterances of the sentence. Despite their focus on linguistic understanding, both views can straightforwardly explain utterance understanding as the output of a derivation/inference from a representation of the sentence uttered. Here, I take issue with these approaches to utterance understanding and then develop an alternative. More specifically, I distinguish two kinds of utterance understanding, experiential and doxastic, and then argue that experiences of what is said by utterances play distinct rational roles in the two kinds of utterance understanding. I conclude by addressing a recent challenge to my proposal
Epistemology · Linguistics · Utterance · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Psychological and Educational Research Studies
The Concept of Mind
Epistemic Explanations
Ethical Intuitionism
Knowing How
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Which Properties are Represented in Perception?
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
The justification of comprehension-based beliefs
Experiences of linguistic understanding as epistemic feelings
Inferential practical knowledge of meaning
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference
Hearing meanings
The process of linguistic understanding
In defense of hearing meanings
Bringing back the voice
Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem
Understanding what was said
When Transmission Fails
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
What Mary Did Yesterday
Content and consciousness
Knowledge and Understanding
Against Hearing Meanings
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
| Citas por año | 3 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Altamente citado | No |