A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21364065 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Marc Lange (0000-0002-0704-7376, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 58 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 520-535 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12469 |
| OpenAlex | W4378672940 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
Roche and Sober (2013; 2014; 2017; 2019) have offered an important new argument that explanatoriness lacks confirmatory significance. My aim in this paper is not only to contend that their argument fails to show that in confirmation ‘there is nothing special about explanatoriness’ (Roche & Sober, 2017: 589), but also to reveal what is special confirmationwise about explanatoriness. I will argue that much of the heavy work in Roche and Sober's argument is done by the dichotomy into which they carve up the philosophical options: either explanatory considerations per se are confirmatorily relevant or they acquire whatever confirmatory significance they may possess only by way of background beliefs and so no differently from non‐explanatory considerations. I will argue that this is a false dichotomy: Explanatoriness per se can have confirmatory relevance even while explanatory considerations acquire their confirmatory relevance only through background opinions. Furthermore, there is ‘something special’ about the background opinions concerning explanations that allow explanatoriness in itself to have confirmatory impact. Unlike other sorts of background, having some background opinions expressly about explanations is indispensable to being an observer at all
Argument (complex analysis) · Confirmation bias · Confirmatory factor analysis · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Nothing · Political science · Relevance (law) · Structural equation modeling · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Scientific Image
Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries
Laws and Symmetry
Ockham's Razors
The Foundations Of Scientific Inference
Van Fraassen's critique of inference to the best explanation
How Explanation Guides Confirmation
The Inference to the Best Explanation
Probability and Evidence
Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning
Action, Knowledge and Reality
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |