Conditional intentions and shared agency

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21364074
AutoresMatthew Rachar (0000-0002-8187-7327, Douglas College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen58
Número1
Páginas271-288
Fecha de publicación2024-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12452
OpenAlexW4323313991
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas26

Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency

Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Business · Collective action · Epistemology · Interdependence · Order (exchange) · Political science · Set (abstract data type) · Sociality · Sociology · Statement (logic) · Structure and agency · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology