Credal imprecision and the value of evidence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21364091 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nilanjan Das (0000-0002-0100-3436, Department of Philosophy University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 57 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 684-721 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12417 |
| OpenAlex | W4283024121 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 54 |
This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence : roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost‐free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision : the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise , i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that it arises when an agent with an imprecise doxastic state engages in an unreflective inquiry , an inquiry where they revise their beliefs using an updating rule that doesn't satisfy a weak reflection principle. In such an unreflective inquiry, certain synchronic norms of instrumental rationality can make it instrumentally irrational for an agent to gather and use cost‐free evidence. I then go on to propose a diachronic norm of instrumental rationality that preserves Value of Evidence in unreflective inquiries. This, I suggest, may help us reconcile this thesis with Rationality of Imprecision
Certainty · Credence · Doxastic logic · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Irrational number · Norm (philosophy) · Positive economics · Rationality · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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Justifying Conditionalization
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On Indeterminate Probabilities
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
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A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
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Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering
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Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I
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The Enterprise of Knowledge
Externalism and exploitability
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia
Weight or the Value of Knowledge
A Little Learning Can Be Dangerous
On the Principle of Total Evidence
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| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |