Rule‐consequentialism, procreative freedom, and future generations

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21379294
AutoresJulia Mosquera (0000-0001-8708-6326, Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS) Stockholm Sweden, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen35
Número4
Páginas333-343
Fecha de publicación2022-12-01
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaRatio (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/rati.12360
OpenAlexW4309758349
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas13

In this paper I analyse how procreative freedom poses a challenge for rule‐consequentialism. First, I reconstruct the rule‐consequentialist case for procreative freedom. Second, I argue that population scenarios resulting from very low fertility pose a problem for rule‐consequentialism since such scenarios cannot secure population growth or even avoid human extinction in the long run. Third, I argue that population scenarios resulting from excessive procreation also pose a problem for rule‐consequentialism since they are incompatible with the promotion of optimific consequences in various ways. Were the rule‐consequentialist to avoid these types of scenarios, the challenge would consist in doing so while retaining the liberal approach to individual rights and freedoms that made rule‐consequentialism an advantageous competitor against moral theories like act‐consequentialism. These population scenarios raise more general questions about how rule‐consequentialism ought to conceptualise the application of universal rules in the long‐term, intergenerational context. This is an important place for inquiry given that rule‐consequentialism is originally conceived as a forward‐looking theory

Consequentialism · Context (archaeology) · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Geography · Law and economics · Population · Sociology · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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