Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21393020 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alejandro Esteller-Moré (0000-0002-7785-6734, Universitat de Barcelona Barcelona Spain, autor de correspondencia), Umberto Galmarini (0000-0001-8540-5581, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Barcelona Spain) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-07-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Scottish Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0036-9292 • E-ISSN: 1467-9485 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjpe.70076 |
| OpenAlex | W7167638761 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 23 |
Wealthy individuals exploit jurisdictional tax differences through mobility, challenging residence‐based tax systems—particularly via fictitious residency changes. We examine theoretically two countries competing to maximize tax revenues from wealthy individuals while auditing fraudulent residency claims. Taxpayers are shown to sort into non‐movers, illegal movers, and legal movers. We characterize equilibrium tax policies across varying conditions of mobility, country size, information exchange, and evasion sanctions. Our main finding is that stronger sanctions and information exchange both increase the optimal level of enforcement, reducing fraudulent tax relocations and increasing legal relocations, with an overall decline in total relocations
Ad valorem tax · Audit · Competition (biology) · Exploit · Indirect tax · Revenue · Sanctions · Tax Evasion · Tax revenue · Economic Policies and Impacts · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |