Anti‐Corruption Policies for Surprise Inspections
Fighting Enforcer's Bribes or Informant's Tips
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21393029 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Andrew Samuel (0000-0002-8059-3365, Loyola University Maryland Baltimore Maryland USA, autor de correspondencia), Jennifer Dougherty (0000-0002-4332-684X, Loyola University Maryland), John Dougherty (Loyola University Maryland Baltimore Maryland USA), Katharine Dix (Financial Engineering Johns Hopkins University Baltimore Maryland USA) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-04-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Scottish Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0036-9292 • E-ISSN: 1467-9485 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjpe.70068 |
| OpenAlex | W7154733427 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 9 |
Regulators utilize surprise inspections to facilitate firms' regulatory compliance. Surprise inspections are valuable because they catch non‐compliant firms “off‐guard,” preventing them from hiding incriminating evidence. However, surprise inspections encourage tip‐offs, wherein a firm pays an informant to warn them about an upcoming inspection, thereby allowing the firm to conceal incriminating evidence. We study the relationship between tipping‐off and bribing an official to avoid a fine, another form of corruption. We show that discouraging bribery encourages tipping‐off. Accordingly, the optimal policy that balances these two countervailing effects will sometimes target only tipping‐off even when it is feasible to fully eliminate bribery
Surprise · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |