On neutral value and fitting indifference

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21395035
AutoresAndrés G Garcia (0000-0002-7472-5456, Department of Philosophy Lund University Lund Sweden, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen62
Número3
Páginas337-347
Fecha de publicación2024-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12547
OpenAlexW4388461044
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas35

A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference , where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature

Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology