What's at Stake in the Race Debate

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21395043
AutoresRon Mallon (0000-0001-8347-8939, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen60
NúmeroS1
Páginas54-72
Fecha de publicación2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12480
OpenAlexW4288925122
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas37

How can there be so much apparent disagreement about what race is, when there is so much agreement on the facts surrounding race? In this paper, I develop this puzzle and consider several interpretations of work in the philosophy of race to try to answer it, several ways of understanding what the metaphysics of race is doing. I consider and reject the possibility that apparent disagreement is metaphysically substantive, and I also consider and reject the view that apparent disagreement primarily reflects semantic disagreements. Instead, I suggest that apparent first‐order disagreement over the existence and character of race is a part of a broader, metalinguistic negotiation or conversation about how racial terms can or ought to be used, and I note a range of considerations—including semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, and ethical—that properly play a role in this discussion

Character (mathematics) · Conversation · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Negotiation · Order (exchange) · Race (biology) · Social science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Race, Genetics, and Society