Hyperintensionality for Logics

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21461631
AutoresMaria Beatrice Buonaguidi (0000-0002-1567-7095, King's College London, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-12-13
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaErkenntnis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10670-025-01047-y
OpenAlexW7115009010
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas42

A logic is said to be hyperintensional when it admits connectives or operators creating hyperintensional contexts, i.e. sentential contexts not respecting the intersubstitutivity salva veritate of co-intensionals. Odintsov and Wansing (J Philos Logic 50(1):33–56, 2021) suggest a formal criterion for classifying a logic as hyperintensional based on whether its consequence relation is self-extensional. I argue that satisfaction of Odintsov and Wansing’s criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for characterising a logic as hyperintensional. Indeed, the criterion classifies as hyperintensional logics which are not meant to capture hyperintensional behaviour, and fails to classify as hyperintensional logics which admit some forms of hyperintensional behaviour. I suggest several possible criteria for a logic to count as hyperintensional, arguing that each of them corresponds to a different understanding of hyperintensionality for logics. Then, I weigh these criteria against a family of logics, which display different “nuances” of hyperintensional behaviour. Finally, I gesture towards a diagnosis of hyperintensionality for logics

Algebra over a field · Classical logic · Description logic · Intermediate logic · Many-valued logic · Ontology · Philosophy of logic · T-norm fuzzy logics · Well-formed formula · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy and Theoretical Science