Graded causation and moral responsibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21461695
AutoresVera Hoffmann-Kolss (0000-0001-5324-0559, University of Bern, autor de correspondencia), Matthias Rolffs (0000-0002-8001-6963, University of Bern)
Año2025
Volumen90
Número6
Páginas2219-2237
Fecha de publicación2025-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaErkenntnis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10670-024-00797-5
OpenAlexW4395047284
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas28

Theories of graded causation attract growing attention in the philosophical debate on causation. An important field of application is the controversial relationship between causation and moral responsibility. However, it is still unclear how exactly the notion of graded causation should be understood in the context of moral responsibility. One question is whether we should endorse a proportionality principle, according to which the degree of an agent’s moral responsibility is proportionate to their degree of causal contribution. A second question is whether a theory of graded causation should measure closeness to necessity or closeness to sufficiency. In this paper, we argue that we should indeed endorse a proportionality principle and that this principle supports a notion of graded causation relying on closeness to sufficiency rather than closeness to necessity. Furthermore, we argue that this insight helps to provide a plausible analysis of the so-called ‘Moral Difference Puzzle’ recently described by Bernstein

Causation · Closeness · Epistemology · Moral responsibility · Political science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification