Keeping context in mind

A non-semantic explanation of apparent context-sensitivity

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21461998
AutoresMike Bowker (0000-0002-8556-8724, Lund University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen47
Número1
Páginas191-209
Fecha de publicación2024-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLinguistics and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0165-0157 • E-ISSN: 1573-0549
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10988-023-09396-z
OpenAlexW4387612930
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas41

Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically context-sensitive. As a case study, I consider Sterken’s (Philos. Imprint, 15, 2015a) argument for the context-sensitivity of generic generalisations. I provide a non-semantic explanation of Sterken’s truth-value judgments, which builds on Leslie’s (Philos Perspect 21(1):375–403, 2007; Philos Rev 117(1):1–47, 2008) theory of default generalisation

Epistemology · Heuristics · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Semantic theory of truth · Sentence · Truth condition · Truth value · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation · Artificial Intelligence