Is secondary affect secondary? Anosmia, perceptual absence, and veridical secondary affect without primary affect
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21502007 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jonathan Cohen (0009-0004-3061-9020, Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego La Jolla California USA, autor de correspondencia), Benjamin D Young (0000-0001-5654-2915, Philosophy & Neuroscience University of Nevada, Reno Reno Nevada USA) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-11-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.70012 |
| OpenAlex | W7106705414 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 32 |
This paper challenges the traditional understanding of secondary affect, on which the latter is a cognitive appraisal of a somatic state that already has an antecedent, primary affect. We appeal to cases of acquired anosmia—the loss of the sense of smell—to argue that there are instances where secondary affect arises in the absence of (indeed, because of the absence of) primary affect, and that this can be so even when the secondary state is completely veridical. We conclude that, in this specific sense, secondary affect need not be secondary after all
Cognition · Perception · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Multisensory perception and integration · Olfactory and Sensory Function Studies
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |