Identity-relative paternalism is internally incoherent

Identity-Relative Paternalism, as defended by Wilkinson, holds that paternalistic intervention is justified to prevent an individual from doing to their future selves (where there are weakened prudential unity relations between the current and future self) what it would be justified to prevent them from doing to others.1 Wilkinson, drawing on the work of Parfit and others, defends the notion of Identity-Relative Paternalism from a series of objections. I argue here, however, that Wilkinson overlooks a significant problem for Identity-Relative Paternalism—namely, that it yields unactionable and self-contradictory results when applied to choices where both options present potential harms to future selves

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• Can identity-relative paternalism shift the focus from the principle of autonomy

  Cressida Auckland•Journal of Medical Ethics•2023

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• Implications of identity-relative paternalism

  Dominic Wilkinson•Journal of Medical Ethics•2023

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• The harm principle, personal identity and identity-relative paternalism

  Open Access•Dominic Wilkinson•Journal of Medical Ethics•2023

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