The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21591746
AutoresAndrás Szigeti (0000-0001-6521-9773, Linköping University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen37
Número4
Páginas861-884
Fecha de publicación2024-05-18
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2094232
OpenAlexW4283802596
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas48

This paper argues that emotions can play an epistemic role as justifiers of evaluative beliefs. It also presents the heuristics theory of emotion as an empirically informed explanation of how emotions can play such a role and why they in practice usefully complement non-affective evaluative judgments. As such, the heuristics theory represents a form of moderate rationalism: it acknowledges that emotions can be epistemically valuable, even privileged in some sense, but denies that they would be uniquely privileged. I argue that judgments and emotional responses pick out different but correlated kinds of evaluative properties and therefore emotional responses and non-affective evaluative judgments play mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive roles. It follows that emotional responses can be legitimately drawn upon to support evaluative beliefs, but they lack supreme epistemic authority

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Heuristics · Rationalism · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology