Affective scaffolding and chronic illness

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21591815
AutoresEleanor Alexandra Byrne (0000-0002-3915-0298, Linköping University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen37
Número4
Páginas921-946
Fecha de publicación2024-05-18
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2147422
OpenAlexW4309470631
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas49

Current attempts to understand unusually high rates of psychiatric illness in complex, chronic illnesses can be guilty of operating within an explanatory framework whereby there are two options. Either (a) that the psychiatric predicaments are secondary to the bodily condition, and (b) that they are primary. In this paper, I draw upon philosophical work on affect, contemporary empirical work, and qualitative first-person patient data to illustrate a much messier reality. I argue that affective experience is generally more complex in such conditions, and that a variety of pre- and post-morbid causal factors dynamically interact such that the resultant psychiatric predicaments do not permit to classification as strictly primary or secondary to the bodily condition. Affective scaffolding, in my view, provides an apt theoretical framework for capturing this nuance

Cognitive psychology · Psychotherapist · Communication · Health, psychology, and well-being · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Psychology · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments