Mapping the social order by fund flows
The political geography of employment assurance schemes in India
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 2159641 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Stuart Corbridge, Manoj Srivastava |
| Año | 2013 |
| Volumen | 42 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 455-479 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2013-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Economy and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0308-5147 • E-ISSN: 1469-5766 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03085147.2013.772758 |
| OpenAlex | W1997869384 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
| Referencias citadas | 13 |
Economic growth in India has failed to reduce extreme income poverty or provide decent jobs as effectively as growth has done in East Asia. Mindful of a political threat from the labouring poor, successive governments have offered India's 'surplus populations' guaranteed work, first through the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) and more recently under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This paper uses ethnographic and large-n datasets to examine how the EAS worked in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh; it also utilizes a preliminary dataset for NREGA in Madhya Pradesh. We show that understandings of the EAS were poor among intended beneficiaries in both states. We also show that the EAS did not work better for the rural poor in Madhya Pradesh than in Bihar, notwithstanding the existence of functioning panchayati Raj institutions in the former. Importantly, this calls into question aspects of a conventional decentralization agenda. Most significantly, the paper suggests that geographies of EAS fund flows illuminate the nature and workings of the local state. Distribution of EAS funds within districts and blocks is most uneven where allocative power is effectively monopolized by a regional political boss and/or is unchallenged by bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. We discuss how far the same problems might affect NREGA schemes notwithstanding the more effective information flows and accountability mechanisms that surround them
Accountability · Allocative efficiency · Bureaucracy · Decentralization · Development economics · Distribution (mathematics · Earnings · Economic growth · Economics · Order (exchange · Panchayati raj · Political science · Politics · Poverty · Power (physics · Work (physics · Agricultural risk and resilience · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Social and Economic Development in India · Finance · Law
Class Coalitions and Social Protection
Class Politics and Social Protection
MGNREGA, Power Politics, and Computerization in Andhra Pradesh
Civil society, the state and institutionalizing welfare rights in India
Across the stolen Ponds
The Politics of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in Andhra Pradesh
Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
When food regimes become hegemonic
Class and Social Policy
In the Shadows of the State
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor
The Politics of Public Good Provision
Brainstorming, Modified Logframes and the Conversion of Research Hypotheses into Field Questions
To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations
State in Society
The political economy of government responsiveness
Powerful Women
To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations
Do Rights Work? Law, Activism, and the Employment Guarantee Scheme
Seeing the State
| Obras citantes distintas | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,75 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2014 - 2024 (11) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 9 |