Desperate equilibrium

On Guilt, Law and Rationality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2159657
AutoresThomas Osborne (0000-0002-3225-203X), Thomas J Osborne (0000-0003-1107-7823, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen43
Número1
Páginas40-54
Fecha de publicación2014-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomy and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0308-5147 • E-ISSN: 1469-5766
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03085147.2013.868699
OpenAlexW1983371726
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas7

This paper is about the role of guilt in relation to practical reason. It analyses guilt not as a passive emotion but as a particular kind of strategy at the level of subjective rationality. The concept of guilt occupies a complex and contested semantic space with other concepts, most notably shame. There have been many attempts – philosophical, psychological, sociological – to define these concepts in relation to each other. This paper suggests that whilst guilt is a moral concept that is oriented towards a certain kind of legalism, shame is a moralistic concept. As such, the relations between guilt and shame are discussed in relation to some literary examples, for instance Macbeth's guilt and Conrad's Lord Jim. The conclusion is that on the one hand our confusion over the concept of guilt comes down not least to what may be our confusion over the difficult concept of law and that on the other hand this has consequences that can ultimately be political

Confusion · Epistemology · Legalism (Western philosophy · Linguistics · Object (grammar · Political science · Politics · Psychoanalysis · Rationality · Relation (database · Shame · Sociology · Computer Science · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Law in Society and Culture · Psychology · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology