Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21602957
AutoresAna Vieyra (0000-0001-8726-7143, Institut für Philosophie, Stuttgart Universität Germany, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Fecha de publicación2026-07-03
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.70110
OpenAlexW7167243495
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas27

Hegel identifies thought with the ‘in itself’ of things. It is common to read the statement as an unrestricted claim regarding Hegel's metaphysical view of reality. I argue it should be read as the expression of what speculative truth achieves. When speculative truth is achieved, that which thinking thinks when thinking the true nature of the object is one and the same as that which is truly thinkable in it. Although seemingly uncontroversial, I argue that an overlooked implication of Identity as the achievement of speculative truth is a restrictive view of the adequate objects for speculative cognition: it restricts speculative cognition to things expressing the internally purposive form of the self. I argue this solves a difficulty ‘apperceptive’ interpretations of the Logic face, namely the inability to meet an inflationary standard for metaphysical truth

Hegelianism · Metaphysics · Globalization, Historical Perspectives, and International Relations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Historical Thought

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