Self‐Knowledge and the Capacity to Judge

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21603005
AutoresMatthew Parrott (0000-0002-8951-4600, St Hilda's College Oxford, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Volumen34
Número2
Páginas407-422
Fecha de publicación2026-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.70038
OpenAlexW4416057264
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas64

Several philosophers have sought to explain certain features of self‐knowledge our beliefs on the basis of the relation which holds between them and our judgments. Typically, these philosophers presuppose that there is just a single relation between these, for instance the relation of identity. In this essay, I shall claim that this presupposition is mistaken. Instead, I shall argue that because our capacity to judge has two functions, there are two different types of relation which hold between judgment and belief. In the final section, I show how this dual relations account can resolve an epistemological puzzle that is raised by ‘transparent’ self‐knowledge of one's own beliefs

Presupposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science