The factivity of practical knowledge
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21603240 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dawa Ometto (0000-0002-0452-0017, Research and Data Management Services Utrecht University Utrecht The Netherlands), Niels van Miltenburg (0009-0008-6432-3614, Department of Philosophy and Religeous studies Utrecht University Utrecht The Netherlands, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 32 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 728-742 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-09-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12960 |
| OpenAlex | W4399364876 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 20 |
Anscombean accounts claim that intentional action is essentially characterized by an agent's practical knowledge of what she is doing. Such accounts are threatened by cases in which an agent seemingly fails to know what she is doing because of a mistake in the performance. It thus seems that such accounts are incompatible with the factivity of practical knowledge. We argue that Anscombean accounts should not be defended, as has recently been suggested, by drawing on familiar anti‐skeptical strategies from epistemology, but rather by attending closely to the specifically practical character of agential knowledge
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Psychology
| Altamente citado | No |
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