Blame and Proportionality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21702009
AutoresMarta Johansson Werkmäster (0000-0003-4990-5153, Lund University), Jakob Green Werkmäster (0000-0001-7210-6857, Lund University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen28
Número2
Páginas235-249
Fecha de publicación2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-024-10454-z
OpenAlexW4400467158
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas29

The ethics of blame includes conditions determining whether an instance of blame is permissible. One generally recognised condition is that blame should be proportionate. If it is not proportionate, that speaks against its permissibility. All the same, what exactly amounts to proportionate blame is currently under-theorised. In this paper, we aim to amend this. More precisely, we distinguish between private and overt blame and highlight some of their differences – e.g., that they aggregate differently. Then, we develop an account of proportional blame and draw out some practical implications of our account

Blame · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification