Killing and letting die
Consequence responsibility in guidance control
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21702348 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Mingrui Zhao (0009-0001-6721-7840, Monash University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Volumen | 47 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 121-133 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Metamedicine (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0166-2031 • E-ISSN: 1573-1200 |
| Editorial | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11017-026-09744-7 |
| PMID | 41708572 |
| OpenAlex | W7130308490 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 9 |
This paper reassesses the alleged moral difference between killing and letting die by shifting the analysis from permissibility to the allocation of consequence responsibility. Within Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance-control framework, responsibility is two-staged: agents are conduct-responsible when their behaviour issues from a mechanism they own that is at least moderately reasons-responsive; and they are consequence-responsible when, in addition, the death arises along a non-deviant, normatively intelligible route from that behaviour. I then operationalise the second stage via a disciplined counterfactual-subtraction procedure that is neutral between actions and omissions and that distinguishes consequence-particulars from consequence-universals. Applied to canonical contrasts, the framework yields patterned results: where both killing and letting die satisfy (or both fail) the same responsibility conditions, they are moral equals with respect to the death; where they come apart, any asymmetry tracks ownership, reasons-responsiveness, or decisive causal contribution rather than the surface doing/allowing label. The upshot is a unified, practice-usable standard for foreseeable-death contexts in end-of-life medicine and clinical governance, clarifying documentation, role delineation, and the evidential focus for retrospective appraisal without presupposing a default moral privilege for omissions
Culpability · Moral responsibility · Normative · Ethics in medical practice · Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints · Palliative Care and End-of-Life Issues
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |