Aristotle’s criticism of the “like is known by like” principle (Commentary on De anima II 5, 416b 32 – 417a 20)

One of the principles underlying Aristotle’s theory of sense perception is that the sense faculty is potentially such as the sensible object is actually. On closer examination, this statement turns out to be a modernization of the ancient rule "like is known by like", shared by most of the early Greek philosophers, including Empedocles and Plato. The paper shows that though Aristotle criticizes this principle in his treatise On the Soul, he doesn’t really abandon it. On the contrary, he retains it for his own theory of sense perception while using the notions of the possible and the actual. The paper is written in the form of a line-by-line commentary to De anima II 5 416b 32–417a 20, where Aristotle reproaches his predecessors for the inconsistency and contradictions of their theories; shows that the “like is known by like” principle entails certain difficulties, and solves these difficulties by introducing his own theory of being moved and acted upon, according to which the patient is in a sense unlike the agent and in a sense like it

Art · Criticism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Literature · Perception · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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