Presence, forgiveness, and anger in second-personal morality

In this article I respond to the criticisms of Flavio Williges and Rafael Vogelmann regarding my book The Heart and its Attitudes. I clarify that the notion of presence and heartfelt second-personal connection should not be confined to agents with deontic competence: we can also be mutually present and emotionally connected with children and animals. I further defend my distinction between deontic and heartfelt forgiveness, maintaining that the absence of affective content in the former does not undermine its second-personal character. Finally, I argue that what I describe as “personal anger”—even if not universally categorized as anger—is a genuine form of emotional appeal for recognition within intimate relationships, and should be understood as belonging to the domain of attitudes of the heart

Anger · Appeal · Appeal to emotion · Deontic logic · Sadness · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Philosophical Ethics and Theory