Relative indemnity

Risk, insurance, and kinship in Indian microfinance

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2253003
AutoresSohini Kar (0000-0002-9029-5214, Department of International Development London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE UK, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen23
Número2
Páginas302-319
Fecha de publicación2017-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1359-0987 • E-ISSN: 1467-9655
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1467-9655.12608
OpenAlexW2605291350
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas25
Referencias citadas54

With the growth of commercial microfinance in India, the poor have been increasingly enfolded into circuits of global finance. In making these collateral-free loans, however, microfinance institutions (MFIs) engage in new forms of risk management. While loans are made to women with the goal of economic and social empowerment, MFIs require male kin to serve as guarantors. Drawing on fieldwork in the city of Kolkata, I argue that through the requirement of male guarantors, MFIs hedge on kinship, even as they speculate on the bottom of the pyramid as a new market of accumulation

Business · Collateral · Economic growth · Economics · Empowerment · Financial system · Hedge · Joint and several liability · Kinship · Liability · Microfinance · Microinsurance · Sociology · Anthropological Studies and Insights · Finance · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Socioeconomic Development in Asia