On the qualitative nature of conscious states

Insights from a structuralist theory of mind and meaning

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2262500
AutoresC Salazar (0000-0002-8476-9620, Faculty of Arts University of Lleida Lleida Catalonia Spain, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen35
Número1
Páginas96-110
Fecha de publicación2024-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAnthropology of Consciousness (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1053-4202 • E-ISSN: 1556-3537
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/anoc.12221
OpenAlexW4387958986
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas16

The point of departure of this paper is Penrose's definition of conscious action as that in which stimulus and response are linked by a non-algorithmic relationship, which Penrose defines as 'understanding'. My purpose is to explore the nature of this understanding by means of a two-step process. The first step is provided by Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. This theory provides us with a quantitative measure of conscious states that we need to transform into qualitative meaning. In the second step, we obtain this qualitative meaning with the help of the structuralist theory of mind. From this perspective, meaning originates in the set of qualitative contrasts that define the alternative courses of action that might have been implemented. Work on the analogy between quantitative bits and qualitative binary oppositions does not solve the hard problem of consciousness, but it might help to reformulate it in a new, productive way

Action (physics · Analogy · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Meaning (existential · Perspective (graphical · Qualitative research · Set (abstract data type · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neural dynamics and brain function · Philosophy · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence