Constructivity and Relational Belief
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 22882452 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David E Over (0000-0002-0353-9381, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1983 |
| Volumen | 2 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 41-62 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1983-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Semantics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0167-5133 • E-ISSN: 1477-4593 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/semant/2.1.41 |
| OpenAlex | W2084291960 |
| Idioma | EN |
Relational or de re belief is normally contrasted with propositional or de dicto belief. A completely different distinction has been thought to be that between constructive and non-constructive reasoning. But if we say that a constructive belief is one justified to some extent by constructive reasoning, then we can see that constructive and relational belief are connected. Constructive belief arises from some kind of direct contact (or at least possible contact) with an object, and so does relational belief. In more detail, these two concepts are joined by the pragmatic notion of effective reference: a person can only have a constructive belief or a relational belief about an object if he can effectively refer to it. A speaker is said to use a singular term with effective reference if and only if he has the ability to decide effectively which object it refers to. Effective reference is a vague concept which comes in degrees, but these are also properties of constructive and relational belief. Effective reference is the basis of the most general theory or relational belief, and should itself be founded on an intensional semantics for the concept of ability. Quine puts forward an unacceptable analysis of ability, and any acceptable one would imply that his scepticism about relational belief is unjustified.
Belief revision · Constructive · Epistemology · Object (grammar) · Process (computing) · Quine · Semantics (computer science) · Skepticism · Artificial Intelligence · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |