China views the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines

Popping the cork?

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23134889
AutoresPaul Midford (0000-0001-6512-3296, Kwansei Gakuin University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2004
Volumen4
Número1
Páginas113-145
Fecha de publicación2004-02-01
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1470-482X • E-ISSN: 1470-4838
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/irap/4.1.113
OpenAlexW2160370357
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5

This paper considers whether an alliance can have a reassurance effect on a third-party. It uses hypotheses derived from balance-of-power realism and a revised version of balance-of-threat theory called balance-of-malevolence theory. Using the revised 1997 US–Japan Defense Guidelines as a primary case, Chinese reactions are found to provide greater support for balance-of-malevolence theory. Side-evidence from Japan's decision in the early 1990s to begin deploying troops overseas to participate in humanitarian and UN peacekeeping operations, and its dispatch of naval ships to the Indian Ocean in the wake of 9-11, confirm the centrality of Chinese concerns about Japan's disposition as a military power and the reassurance value of the US alliance and other ‘containment frameworks’ such as UN peacekeeping. This also suggests that the demonstration effect of benign overseas deployments can be effective in overcoming negative attributions about a state's disposition as a military power.

Alliance · Balance (ability) · Centrality · China · Great power · Operations research · Peacekeeping · Political science · Power (physics) · Engineering · Global Political and Social Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology

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