Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality

An Ethics of Virtue

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23137828
AutoresThomas H Brobjer (autor de correspondencia)
Año2003
Volumen26
Número1
Páginas64-78
Fecha de publicación2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Journal of Nietzsche Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0968-8005 • E-ISSN: 1538-4594
EditorialThe Pennsylvania State University Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1353/nie.2003.0020
OpenAlexW2002745215
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas2

In this article I shall attempt to give a birds-eye view of Nietzsche's ethics, with special emphasis on its affirmative aspect. I will also attempt to show that there exists one relatively simple aspect of Nietzsche's ethics that has not been realized, but that makes it much more consistent and comprehensible. In summary: Nietzsche's ethics, unlike almost all thinking about ethics in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth was not act-oriented but character- or person-oriented. This kinship of Nietzsche's affirmative ethics with ethics of virtue has not been realized, but the interest in ethics of virtue during the last twenty years now also makes it easier to grasp Nietzsche's ethics.

Character (mathematics) · Epistemology · Information ethics · Meta-ethics · Morality · Normative ethics · Political science · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Law · Mathematics · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy