Socratic Moral Psychology

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23151514
AutoresThomas C Brickhouse (University of Lynchburg), Nicholas D Smith (0000-0001-7410-6914, Lewis & Clark College)
Año2010
Fecha de publicación2010-05-06
Open AccessSí
TipoBOOK
RevistaSocratic Moral Psychology (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/cbo9780511776946
OpenAlexW1594441534
Open LibraryOL34450998M
ISBN9780511776946
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas26
Referencias citadas53

Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer an alternative interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed.

Epistemology · Intellectualism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Moral psychology · SOCRATES · Socratic method · Virtue · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Virtue and virtues