Market Governance as a Balance of Power
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 2317536 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Steven Vogel (0000-0002-8597-575X, University of California, Berkeley, autor de correspondencia), Steven K Vogel (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 51 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 319-336 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Latin American Politics and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1531-426X • E-ISSN: 1548-2456 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00323292231183834 |
| OpenAlex | W4384695754 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
This essay conceptualizes market governance as a balance of power and discusses the implications for current debates over antitrust policy. This framework offers a way to interpret and evaluate the 'neo-Brandeisian' school that views concentrated market power as a threat to democracy as well as to economic goals, such as productivity and innovation. It suggests that the government can deploy antitrust policy to alter the balance of power to promote the public welfare without necessarily impeding competition or otherwise distorting markets. And antitrust policies that constrain market power can have the double benefit of making both markets and politics more competitive
Balance (ability · Business · Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economic growth · Economic system · Economics · Government (linguistics · Industrial organization · Market economy · Market power · Monopoly · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Productivity · Public economics · Public policy · Welfare · Economic Theory and Institutions · Finance · Law · Political Economy and Marxism
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |