Nietzsche, Nature, Nurture
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23205671 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Aaron Ridley (Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities University of Southampton UK, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 25 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 129-143 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-03-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12190 |
| OpenAlex | W2472918624 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 14 |
Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self‐contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science , the chief source for this aspect of his thought.
Acknowledgement · Argument (complex analysis) · Doctrine · Epistemology · Linguistics · Nature versus nurture · Reading (process) · Sociology · Theology · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
Autonomy, Self‐Respect, and Self‐Love
Schopenhauer
Nietzsche on Art and Freedom
Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual
Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason
What is a Nietzschean Self?1
Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology
Nietzsche's System
Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology
Against Nietzsche's ‘Theory’ of the Drives
The Deed Is Everything
Nietzsche and Kant on the Will
| Citas por año | 0,67 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2022 (3) |
| Altamente citado | No |