Transcendental vs. comparative approaches to justice

A reappraisal of Sen's dichotomy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23211367
AutoresRagip Ege, Ragıp Ege (Russian State Agrarian Correspondence University, autor de correspondencia), Herrade Igersheim (Schlumberger (Ireland), autor de correspondencia), Charlotte Le Chapelain (Lyon College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Volumen23
Número4
Páginas521-543
Fecha de publicación2016-07-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of the History of Economic Thought (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0967-2567 • E-ISSN: 1469-5936
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672567.2014.916734
OpenAlexW2070850035
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas25

In The Idea of Justice , Sen describes two competing approaches to theorising about justice: “transcendental institutionalism”, in which he includes Rawls, and “realisation-focused comparison”, in which he includes Condorcet and himself. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that a comparative approach cannot exist without a transcendental dimension. Contrary to Sen, who claims that a transcendental theory is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to frame comparative judgments, it is shown that a transcendental dimension is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition of any comparative approach. To illustrate our thesis, we refer to the works of three great authors: Condorcet, Sen himself and the later Rawls.

Condorcet method · Dimension (graph theory) · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Frame (networking) · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Pure mathematics · Realisation · Reflexive pronoun · Transcendental number · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy, Sociology, Political Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theory and Influence