Can Parfit’s Appeal to Incommensurabilities in Value Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion?
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23212875 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Włodek Rabinowicz (0000-0001-5910-0258, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2022 |
| Páginas | 430-460 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2022-01-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | CHAPTER |
| Revista | Ethics and Existence (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780192894250.003.0016 |
| OpenAlex | W4206823444 |
| ISBN | 9780192894250 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
Parfit proposed blocking the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by letting incommensurabilities (“imprecise equalities” in his terminology) intervene at some points in the argument’s population sequence. It is an attractive option. But the relevant incommensurabilities need to be very thoroughgoing if the argument is to be blocked: they must persist even if the next population in the sequence is improved by making it arbitrarily larger. While such persistency might well seem problematic (not just in this case but also when it comes to blockings other spectrum arguments), this article suggests how it can be explained and defended if incommensurability is interpreted on the lines of the fitting-attitudes analysis of value relations. On that analysis, two items are incommensurable if divergent preferential attitudes towards them are permissible (i.e., not unfitting); for example, if it is permissible to prefer one item to the other but also permissible to have the opposite preference. It is shown how to provide a modeling of this kind for persistent incommensurability and how to account for this persistency. However, even if Parfit’s main suggestion can in this way be defended, one of his substantive value assumptions—the Simple View regarding the marginal value of added lives—should be given up, to avoid implausible implications.
Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Population · Positive economics · Preference · Simple (philosophy) · Sociology · Statistics · Terminology · Value (mathematics) · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |