In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23398186 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jon Williamson (0000-0003-0514-4209, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Páginas | 185 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-04-29 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | In defence of objective Bayesianism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W596488402 |
| Open Library | OL24523855M |
| ISBN | 9780199228003 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 63 |
Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
Bayesian probability · Epistemology · Equivocation · Mathematical economics · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Bayesian Analysis · Bayesian statistical decision theory · Mathematical models · Probability & Statistics · Reasoning · Theory of knowledge
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I
Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing
Fast Methods for Drug Approval
The Impact of Meta-Induction
Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief
Does Meta-induction Justify Induction
Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design
Direct Inference and Probabilistic Accounts of Induction
Ambiguity, Coherence and Performance
There is Nothing Magical about Bayesian Statistics
Belief-Credence Interaction Beyond Arbitrary Partitions
Evidence and Cognition
E.T. Jaynes’s Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity
Discovering Maximum Entropy Knowledge
Epistemology and the Structure of Language
Optimality justifications and the optimality principle
Evil and the god of indifference
Plausibility and probability in juridical proof
The objective–subjective dichotomy and its use in describing probability
Confirmation bias and the plausible distribution of evidence
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity
Perception and Probability
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle
How to resolve doxastic disagreement
How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal
Empirical evidence claims are a priori
The new Tweety puzzle
Formal schemas of induction as models
Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research
Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws
Infinite frequency principles of direct inference
What to do with a forecast
Mechanistic probability
How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
Prediction with expert advice applied to the problem of prediction with expert advice
Tracking probabilistic truths
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership
Nudging for changing selves
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles
Conceptualising morally permissible risk imposition without quantified individual risks
Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions
A Battle in the Statistics Wars
Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
A Theory of Epistemic Risk
How to Model Mechanistic Hierarchies
Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices
A Naturalist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference
An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
Calibration and Convexity
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
Bayesian Confirmation
Understanding the Replication Crisis as a Base Rate Fallacy
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference
Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions
Entropy and Insufficient Reason
A Bayesian Account of Establishing
Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II
The Uniqueness Thesis
| Obras citantes distintas | 63 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 4,2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 61 |