Decision Theory with a Human Face
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23398258 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Richard Bradley (0000-0003-3513-5661) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-10-26 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | Decision Theory with a Human Face (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/9780511760105 |
| OpenAlex | W2762756358 |
| Open Library | OL34714486M |
| ISBN | 9780511760105 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 91 |
When making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate. Nonetheless, they aim to make the best decisions possible. In Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley develops new theories of agency and rational decision-making, offering guidance on how 'real' agents who are aware of their bounds should represent the uncertainty they face, how they should revise their opinions as a result of experience and how they should make decisions when lacking full awareness of, or precise opinions on relevant contingencies. He engages with the strengths and flaws of Bayesian reasoning, and presents clear and comprehensive explorations of key issues in decision theory, from belief and desire to semantics and learning. His book draws on philosophy, economics, decision science and psychology, and will appeal to readers in all of these disciplines.
Agency (philosophy) · Appeal · Decision theory · Economics · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Key (lock) · Management science · Political science · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Engineering · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Psychology
Folk Psychology and the Interpretation of Decision Theory
Probability and informed consent
Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents
A model of common law adjudication
Comparative opinion loss
Justice In-Between
Prioritarianism
The Diagnostic Value of Freedom
The Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Ambiguity
Suppositional Desires and Rational Choice Under Moral Uncertainty
The Specter of Revealed Preference Theory
Humean Moral Realism Without Irony
Conditionals
Normative folk psychology and decision theory
In defence of revealed preference theory
Ambiguity, Coherence and Performance
Adaptive preferences, self-expression and preference-based freedom rankings
Improvisation in Public Administration
The Ethics of Fire
The Practical Import of Higher-Order Defeat
Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities
Reasonable Doubt from Unconceived Alternatives
Beyond Values
There Is No Such Thing as Expected Moral Choice-Worthiness
Deference and decision
Counterfactuals, intention and dynamic choice
Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions
Fairness, ambiguity and dynamic consistency
Dynamic choice without the completeness axiom
Evidence, causality, and sequential choice
Bounded rationality with subjective evaluations in enlivened but truncated decision trees
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory
Attitudes toward risk are complicated
Fairness and risk attitudes
Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty
Dynamic consistency in the logic of decision
The case for comparability
Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction
Taking Risks, With and Without Probabilities
Uncertain preferences in rational decision
Impartial Evaluation under Ambiguity
Awareness Revision and Belief Extension
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories
The Scope of Longtermism
In Defence of Pigou–Dalton for Chances
The balance and weight of reasons
A Brief History of Social Choice and Welfare Theory
Standard rationality versus inclusive rationality
Consequences of comparability
The role of uncertainty in cost-benefit analysis for natural risks prevention
Good Guesses
Rational risk‐aversion
The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance
Evidential Preemption
The Nature of Awareness Growth
Conditional desirability
On the Individuation of Choice Options
Testimonial justification under epistemic conflict of interest
Material foundations of ecological rationality
Expert deference as a belief revision schema
Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice
How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
Prediction with expert advice applied to the problem of prediction with expert advice
Irrationality and Indecision
Radical interpretation and decision theory
Expert deference and Adams conditionalization
Judgementalism about normative decision theory
Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes
Contra counterfactism
Modeling intentional agency
The intrinsic value of risky prospects
Disagreement-based uncertainty for decision making
Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis
Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions
A Battle in the Statistics Wars
Awareness growth and dispositional attitudes
Confidence in Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Phylogenetic Economics
How to Measure Effect Sizes for Rational Decision Making
Making Confident Decisions with Model Ensembles
Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence
Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia
Methodologies of Uncertainty
The Ambiguity Dilemma for Imprecise Bayesians
What Is Risk Aversion
The Chances of Choices
The Problem of State-Dependent Utility
Catastrophic risk
Maximal Cluelessness
Revisiting the criticisms of rational choice theories
| Obras citantes distintas | 91 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 11,38 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 86 |