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Decision Theory with a Human Face

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23398258
AutoresRichard Bradley (0000-0003-3513-5661)
Año2017
Fecha de publicación2017-10-26
Open AccessNo
TipoBOOK
RevistaDecision Theory with a Human Face (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/9780511760105
OpenAlexW2762756358
Open LibraryOL34714486M
ISBN9780511760105
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas91

When making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate. Nonetheless, they aim to make the best decisions possible. In Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley develops new theories of agency and rational decision-making, offering guidance on how 'real' agents who are aware of their bounds should represent the uncertainty they face, how they should revise their opinions as a result of experience and how they should make decisions when lacking full awareness of, or precise opinions on relevant contingencies. He engages with the strengths and flaws of Bayesian reasoning, and presents clear and comprehensive explorations of key issues in decision theory, from belief and desire to semantics and learning. His book draws on philosophy, economics, decision science and psychology, and will appeal to readers in all of these disciplines.

Agency (philosophy) · Appeal · Decision theory · Economics · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Key (lock) · Management science · Political science · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Engineering · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Psychology

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Obras citantes distintas91
Citas por año11,38
Intervalo de citas2018 - 2026 (9)
Velocidad de citacióncurrent
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 86
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