Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23453059 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Vincent P Crawford (0000-0003-0532-0305, University of California San Diego, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Páginas | 344-373 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-12-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | CHAPTER |
| Revista | Advances in Behavioral Economics (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Princeton University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.17 |
| OpenAlex | W4255061962 |
| ISBN | 9781400829118 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 7 |
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny.Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict its equilibria; selecting one using common sense, equilibrium refinements, dynamic arguments, or convenience; comparing the selected equilibrium with stylized facts and intuitions about outcomes; and eliminating discrepancies, as far as possible, by adjusting the model or proposing new selection criteria.The unstated goal of most such analyses has been to predict behavior entirely by theory.Although this approach has plainly been productive, it has also revealed the limits of what can be learned by theory alone.Theoretical analyses (traditional or adaptive) usually yield definite predictions only under strong assumptions, which are reasonable for some applications but unrealistic and potentially misleading for many others.As a result, most strategic applications raise questions about the principles that govern behavior that are not convincingly resolved by theory, in addition to questions about preferences and the environment like those encountered in nonstrategic applications.Further progress in understanding those principles now seems likely to depend as much on systematic observation and careful empirical work as on further advances in theory.Experiments will play a leading role in this empirical work.Behavior in games is notoriously sensitive to the details of the environment, so that strategic models carry a heavy informational burden, which is often compounded in the field by an inability to observe all relevant variables.Important advances in experimental technique over the past three decades allow a control that often gives experiments a decisive advantage in identifying the relationship between behavior and the environment.There is now a substantial body of experimental work that uses wellmotivated subjects and careful designs to address central questions about strategic behavior.I believe this work deserves to be taken seriously.For many questions it is the most important source of empirical information we have, and it is unlikely to be less reliable than casual empiricism or introspection.More generally, I believe that there is much to be gained by supplementing conversations among theorists with a dialogue between theorists and experimentalists, in which theoretical ideas are confronted with observation as well as intuition.This paper considers the roles of theory and experiment in the analysis of strategic interaction, with the goal of encouraging and focusing the dialogue that has already begun.I emphasize the benefits to theorists of thinking about experiments, which is both what I know best and the direction in which the dialogue seems most in need of encouragement.My principal goals are to identify the kinds of theory that are useful in interpreting experimental evidence and to draw and Mark Machina for advice, and Miguel Costa-Gomes for able research assistance.My debt to Thomas Schelling and the many experimentalists and theorists who have since studied behavior in games should be clear from the text.
Economics · Microeconomics · Strategic interaction · Computer Science · Global and Cross-Cultural Management · Psychology
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |