On the Guise of the Good

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23752178
AutoresJoseph Raz (autor de correspondencia)
Año2010
Páginas111-135
Fecha de publicación2010-07-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoCHAPTER
RevistaDesire, practical reason, and the good (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0006
OpenAlexW4252246751
ISBN9780195382440
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16

The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and that the thesis plays a crucial role in uniting theories of action, rationality, and normativity.

Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Normative · Presupposition · Rationality · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification