Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 24035274 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Andrew F Daughety (Vanderbilt University), Jennifer F Reinganum (Vanderbilt University) |
| Año | 2008 |
| Volumen | 164 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 106-126 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2008-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Editorial | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/jite-2008-0005 |
| OpenAlex | W3121207828 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 5 |
We examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute. Costly disclosure and price-signaling of safety are alternative firm strategies. The liability system and production cost determine the firm's full marginal cost. When the firm's full marginal cost is increasing (decreasing) in safety, a firm with a safer product will distort its price upward (downward) and will sometimes inefficiently choose to signal rather than disclose (to disclose rather than signal). We also allow for a small fraction of naively optimistic (pessimistic) consumers; this leads to less price distortion and decreased (increased) incentives to disclose.
Business · Liability · Accounting · Ethics in Business and Education · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Regulation and Compliance Studies
| Citas por año | 0,25 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Altamente citado | No |