The Irony of Free Will

This paper reconceptualizes free will as a concept that evolved culturally as a justification for our moral practices. Such a justification becomes relevant when people consider the possibility that human behaviour results from causes rather than reasons. Such a causal story might imply that our actions lie beyond our control, which threatens the intelligibility of our moral practices. The concept, however, has led to much confusion and endless philosophical debates. Moreover, it exacerbates rather than mitigates people’s worries about our everyday reason-exchanging moral practices. We show how our proposal finds support in and clarifies some of the empirical literature on free will and aligns with an approach that focuses on the necessary and sufficient conditions of moral responsibility. By bringing together the insights of these different discussions, we hope to offer some remedy against the persistent confusions and worries raised by the concept of free will.

causal determinism · Cultural Evolution · Free will · moral justification · moral practice · Moral responsibility · Philosophy of mind · reasons for action · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment