The Politics of Government Expenditures in Tanzania, 1999-2007
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 2431799 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Laura Weinstein (0009-0008-8948-0712, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Volumen | 54 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 33-57 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | African Studies Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0002-0206 • E-ISSN: 1555-2462 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1353/arw.2011.0023 |
| OpenAlex | W2057276685 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 14 |
| Referencias citadas | 23 |
What allocation strategy do hegemonic party regimes pursue in order to increase their level of electoral support? Although the literature has established that targeting resources to marginally supportive districts is the most effective distributive strategy for competitive democracies, it has not been possible to make a clear prediction about the best strategy for hegemonic party regimes. This article seeks to address this puzzle by examining the patterns by which expenditures were distributed by the Tanzanian ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), across the country's 114 mainland districts from 1999 through 2007. Overall, this study finds that CCM targeted expenditures toward those districts that elected the party with the highest margin of victory
Development economics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Hegemony · Margin (machine learning · Market economy · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Socioeconomics · Subsidy · Tanzania · Victory · African studies and sociopolitical issues · Finance · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Political Economy Determinants of Public Spending Allocations
Natural gas extraction and community development in Tanzania
The politics of the education budget
Money Flows, Water Trickles
Beyond “Good Governance”
Does decentralization encourage pro-poor targeting? Evidence from Kenya’s constituencies development fund
Open Data from Authoritarian Regimes
Texting Complaints to Politicians
Does electoral competition affect public goods provision in dominant-party regimes? Evidence from Tanzania
The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war
(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya's Constituencies Development Fund
Do Hegemonic-Party Regimes Reward or Punish Voters? A Tale of Distributive Politics in Tanzania
Umoja ni ushindi(Unity is victory)
The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999
Voting for Autocracy
Do Formulas Reduce Political Influence on Intergovernmental Grants? Evidence from Tanzania
The specification of ethnic cleavages and ethnopolitical groups for the analysis of democratic competition in contemporary Africa
Why People Pay Taxes
Electoral goals and center-state transfers
Markets and States in Tropical Africa
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Democratic Experiments in Africa
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania
The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel
Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays
Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market
Governance, Local Politics and Districtization in Tanzania
The Political Economy of Clientelism
Taxation, coercion and donors
Tax Me If You Can
The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (Foncodes), 1991-95
| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,27 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2015 - 2022 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 14 |