Resource Allocations in United Funds

Examination of Power and Dependence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2554375
AutoresJ Pfeffer (0000-0002-6278-9735, University of California, Berkeley, autor de correspondencia), Anthony Leong, Anthony S-Y Leong (University of California, Berkeley)
Año1977
Volumen55
Número3
Páginas775
Fecha de publicación1977-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocial Forces (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0037-7732 • E-ISSN: 1534-7605
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2577470
OpenAlexW4239060413
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10

Allocations to member agencies in 1962, 1967, and 1972 were examined for a sample of 66 United Funds. It was argued that the allocations to agencies would be a function of the power of the agency in the Fund, which was determined by the agency's dependence on the Fund and the Fund's dependence on the agency. As expected, there was a positive correlation between outside funds raised and resources received from the United Fund, and this result held when various community demographic variables were introduced into the analysis as controls. Further, as predicted by the power-dependence formulation, the relationship between outside funds and allocations from the United Fund was larger for agencies that were less dependent on the Fund and on whom the Fund was more dependent

Actuarial science · Agency (philosophy) · Business · Closed-end fund · Economics · Fund accounting · Fund administration · Fund of funds · Income fund · Institutional investor · Microeconomics · Open-end fund · Power (physics) · Resource dependence theory · Accounting · Economic Growth and Development · Finance · International Development and Aid · Natural Resources and Economic Development