Separating the Reporting Effects from the Injury Rate Effects of Workers' Compensation Insurance

A Hedonic Simulation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3216488
AutoresThomas J Kniesner (0000-0002-9820-4778, Bentley University), John D Leeth
Año1989
Volumen42
Número2
Páginas280
Fecha de publicación1989-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2523359
OpenAlexW4253122562
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas20

This paper presents a numerical simulation, based on data from the early 1970s, to investigate the economic links between labor market outcomes and the workers' compensation insurance system. The results suggest that, in most cases, any of three changes in the system-more generous benefits, more accurate categorization of insurance claims, or more complete experience rating of premiums-will slightly reduce the actual number of work-related injuries but will dramatically increase the number of insurance claims filed. The authors conclude that changes in self-reported injuries can produce significant misimpressions of the safety incentives created by the workers' compensation insurance system

Actuarial science · Auto insurance risk selection · Automobile insurance · Business · Casualty insurance · Categorization · Compensation (psychology) · Econometrics · Economics · Incentive · Insurance policy · Microeconomics · Work (physics) · Workers' compensation · Computer Science · Engineering · Housing Market and Economics · Insurance and Financial Risk Management · Psychology · Social Psychology · Traffic and Road Safety