Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3218550
AutoresFrancis Green (0000-0002-6786-5012, London School of Economics and Political Science), Steven Mcintosh (0000-0002-9492-5455)
Año1998
Volumen51
Número3
Páginas363
Fecha de publicación1998-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2525113
OpenAlexW3121420732
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas41

The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of external threats in raising workers' effort is mediated by, among other labor market conditions, the presence or absence of a powerful union. In particular, they argue that because powerful unions reduce the potency of the external threat of job loss (by making it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers), the pace of work is less responsive to such a threat in strongly unionized plants than in weakly unionized plants. The results of an analysis of data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in Britain support this hypothesis. The analysis also yields evidence that effort is increased where workers are rewarded individually according to results, and where there are various communication channels between workers and management

Business · Economic growth · Economics · Job loss · Labour economics · Management · Operations management · Pace · Power (physics) · Raising (metalworking) · Trade union · Unemployment · Work (physics) · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Engineering · Industrial relations · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions