Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma

How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3239147
AutoresJack Paine (0000-0002-2213-7687, University of Rochester, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen116
Número4
Páginas1425-1442
Fecha de publicación2022-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055422000089
OpenAlexW4214951117
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas19
Referencias citadas38

Dictators confront a guardianship dilemma: military agents are needed to defeat mass outsider movements, but these agents can overthrow the ruler from within. In existing theories, rulers prioritize coup-proofing measures unless they anticipate strong outsider threats. Then dictators prioritize military competence. I reframe the guardianship dilemma around the central idea that militaries can choose between dual disloyalty options. In addition to staging a coup, militaries can defect by not fending off popular uprisings or rebellions. Dictators fear competent militaries not primarily because of their coup threat but instead because they often survive intact following a regime transition. Low motivation for competent militaries to save the ruler undermines their rationale of guarding against outsider threats, even if they pose a low coup threat. Consequently, rulers prioritize competence under narrow circumstances. Only radically oriented outsider movements that pose an existential threat to all regime elites induce loyalty from a competent military

Cognitive reframing · Dilemma · Law and economics · Legal guardian · Political economy · Political science · Ruler · Sociology · Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology