The Economic Effect of Strikes on the Shareholders of Nonstruck Competitors

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3301419
AutoresJonathan K Kramer (Lehigh University), Geraldo M Vasconcellos
Año1996
Volumen49
Número2
Páginas213
Fecha de publicación1996-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2524939
OpenAlexW4253202008
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas14

Prior research has established that strikes incur significant economic losses for the struck firms. This event study of intraindustry strike effects in highly concentrated industries focuses on two samples: firms that experienced a strike involving 1,000 or more workers between 1982 and 1990, and the nonstruck firms that were their closest competitors. Contrary to the prediction of some models that the economic losses incurred by struck firms are captured by their nonstruck competitors, the results indicate that the total spillover from shareholders of the struck firms to shareholders of the nonstruck competitors in this sample was not statistically significant. The authors speculate that the struck firms were able to limit spillover effects through such tactics as stockpiling inventory before a strike. Also, concessions by labor, which were common outcomes of collective bargaining during the sample period, probably significantly reduced the struck firms' total strike cost

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